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PPP FOR SCHOOLS IN FLANDERS: COMPLEX 
STRUCTURE IN A COMPLEX CONTEXT  
INTRODUCTION 
While PPPs are popular in the public sector across the world and frequently discussed by 
politicians, practitioners and academics, there is a remarkable lack of empirical research into 
the actual governance of PPPs (Hodge, Greve, and Boardman 2010; Bloomfield 2006). PPPs 
present important management and governance challenges, like governance by public and 
private actors in a complex multi-level or/and multi-actor context (Flinders 2010; Skelcher 
2010; Donahue and Zeckhauser 2012). Increased involvement of different actors and tiers 
makes public tasks and corresponding responsibilities more ambiguous and confused. This 
article focuses on the interaction between elements of complexity, the governance structure of 
PPPs, and its combined effect on performance. After discussing the research strategy, the 
empirical data of a single case study in Flanders is presented. To conclude, this article ends 
with the lessons learned from the case study. 
RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Analytical framework 
Before discussing complexity and governance issues of PPPs, the ‘PPP’ concept has to be 
delineated as a clear and shared definition of ‘PPP’ is missing (Hodge, Greve, and Boardman 
2010). A broad spectrum of arrangements between traditionally procured government projects 
and full privatization exists, as many different ways of cooperation/partnership between 
public and private partners try to fill this space, differing from country to country (OECD 
2008; Grimsey and Lewis 2007). Given this lack of definitional clarity, an alternative way to 
grasp the nature of the concept PPP is to accept this diversity and attempt to classify different 
types of PPPs. This article explicitly focuses on so called long-term DBFM (design build 
finance maintain) programs related to public infrastructure. 
Long-term PPP contracts are complex and risky undertakings, and governments hoping to 
achieve the theoretical benefits of long-term contracting with a private partner are confronted 
with daunting management and governance challenges (Bloomfield 2006). Since the  
knowledge about specific factors that contribute to PPP governance and project success or 
failure is still limited (Bloomfield 2006; Hodge 2004), Van Gestel et al. (2012) introduced an 
analytical framework to help and fill that gap. This framework tries to capture the entire cycle 
of the process of a PPP in order to improve the understanding of how governance of PPPs 
affects their performance.  
Using the case of a complex PPP program to develop school infrastructure commissioned by 
the Flemish government, this article tries to contribute to the understanding of the ‘black box’ 
called PPP performance. Evaluating PPPs performance or ‘value for money’ is not easy, given 
the different goals PPPs are supposed to serve. Hodge (2010) states that many evaluation 
studies are rather weak and the data dirty, resulting in evaluations with mixed and 
contradictory results. He calls for more evidence-based learning and synthesis, combined with 
a cross-disciplinary set of perspectives and skills. This article is a modest contribution to this 
justified ambition. First important elements of complexity are scrutinized, subsequently 
governance mechanisms to manage those complexities are looked at, and finally some results 
are presented (See Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Analytical framework 
 
Methodology 
Since the article aims to uncover social mechanisms behind the interplay between complexity, 
governance and performance of PPPs, a qualitative approach seems most suitable. Various 
authors see qualitative research as an important first step in the process of theory construction 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Yin 2009; Geddes 2003). The presented analytical 
framework will be applied to a particular case (i.e. PPP project) through a detailed description 
of its attributes and the relationship and dynamics within it. It is an illustration of what Yin 
(2009) calls a 'case description'. 
In this article the focus is on the school infrastructure PPP (DBFM) program of the Flemish 
government. The case was selected in an information oriented way, namely as an “unique 
case” containing lots of interesting and relevant material (Flyvbjerg 2006). The PPP program 
for Flemish school infrastructure is a single case characterized by different elements of 
complexity, and therefore a promising example to find out how complexity, control and the 
applied governance strategy relate to each other, and how that interaction affects overall 
performance. In short, Flemish PPP school infrastructure offers an example of how a 
government opts for a complex solution for a complex challenge (with the unfortunate event 
of a worsening wider environment). It remains to be seen whether this was the most optimal 
choice in terms of performance. The methods used are twofold: a broad document analysis 
and various (n=9) semi-structured interviews with key players. 
CASE STUDY: THE FLEMISH PPP PROJECT ‘SCHOOLS OF 
TOMORROW’ 
The PPP project ‘Schools of Tomorrow’ is one of the largest PPP programs introduced by the 
Flemish government. Before applying the analytic framework, first the context wherein the 
PPP project took its actual form will be outlined.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
COMPLEXITY 
 
 Multi-actor/level 
- Decentralized 
policy context 
 Technical 
- Financial 
- Legal 
 Political 
- Political saliency 
- Social urgency 
GOVERNANCE 
 
 Ambitious scale 
- Large & unseen 
- Limited experience 
& expertise 
 Bundled program 
- 211 projects in 1 
framework 
 Hybrid structure 
- Contracts 
- Separate & mixed 
company (SPV) 
PERFORMANCE 
 
 Product 
performance 
 Process 
performance 
WORSENING EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT  
BY FINANCIAL CRISIS 
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Context 
The state of school infrastructure in Flanders (northern region of Belgium) is problematic for 
several reasons. Decades of structural underinvestment due to public savings since the late 
seventies resulted in an old and outdated school infrastructure, no longer meeting current 
standards. Recently, Flanders also faces a school infrastructure shortage in many cities due to 
demographic evolutions. Almost 2.650 dossiers for subsidy applications are on the waiting list 
of AGIOn (public agency for school infrastructure) worth EUR 2,65 billion in September 
2012 (AGIOn 2011) and the investment need of ‘GO!’(Community Education) is estimated at 
EUR 1,9 billion, totaling over EUR 4,5 billion. The estimated waiting time for new school 
infrastructure is more than ten years and many schools take refuge in provisional 
prefabricated ‘container classes’.  
Main educational networks calculated that annual subsidies need multiplication by factor 2.5 à 
3 to reduce the waiting list in a reasonable time span. The Flemish government hence looked 
for new ways to construct and finance school infrastructure, meeting the needs of the target 
group (different educational networks and school boards) while respecting their autonomy. 
The Flemish government also wanted ways providing ‘value added’ compared to existing 
subsidies, like accelerated project implementation, better cost control, compliance with higher 
(innovative) technical requirements, and improved availability and flexibility of school 
infrastructure. The Flemish government worked on two different ideas in 2003, namely an 
investment fund trying to get one billion euros from Flemish individual investors to build new 
school infrastructure, and the implementation of  a ‘DBFM’ PPP-formula.   
In 2004, the minister of education (social-democrat) denounced the option of the investment 
fund, claiming it was too expensive and too complex. The Flemish government (led by a 
Christian-democrat) choose to put the second idea into practice. In a highly indebted country 
like Belgium, the Flemish government searched for alternative ways to finance large 
infrastructure projects without further raising debt and taxes. A two-track policy was therefore 
developed for school infrastructure. One track was a large catch-up program through PPP 
totaling EUR 1,5 billion, with new schools designed, build, financed and maintained (DBFM) 
by a private partner. This DBFM company (SPV) makes school buildings available to school 
boards and takes care of the maintenance for 30 years. In turn, school boards pay a 
performance-related availability fee for the contract period, and the building’s ownership is 
transferred to the school boards free of charge afterwards. The second track was an increase 
of the regular subsidy system through AGIOn, a public agency subsidizing purchase, 
construction and renovation of school buildings, with an annual budget of ca. EUR 190 
million. 
Complexity 
The need for new and additional school infrastructure in the region of Flanders was pressing. 
The Flemish government had to establish an appropriate solution, and set a number of 
preconditions:  (1) accelerated elimination of the existing gap in school infrastructure (short 
term); (2) maximum realization with limited resources; (3) creation of an additional incentive 
for employment in the construction industry; (4) creation of modern school infrastructure; (5) 
creation of  a flexible and organic school infrastructure; (6)  ESA 95 neutral investment, kept 
off-balance. In a critical report on PPPs in Flanders, the Belgian Court of Audit confirmed 
that in the start and preparation stage, budget neutrality was empathized more than societal, 
operational and financial value added (Rekenhof 2009). The Flemish government wanted to 
invest significantly in infrastructure, without endebting itself from an ESA 95 perspective, 
thus embracing PPP as an ESA 95 neutral investment method.  
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Within this more or less 'mandatory' policy framework, some elements of "complexity" were 
very crucial for further project structuring and the applied instruments for steering and 
control. In what follows the most important aspects of multi-actor complexity, technical 
complexity and political complexity are discussed. 
 Multi-actor complexity 
Freedom of education is a fundamental right safeguarded by the Belgian Constitution, shaping 
a particular educational landscape characterized by three main educational networks with high 
autonomy to organize education themselves.  
Table 1: Educational landscape in Flanders 
Community 
Education (16,5% 
of the pupils): 
public institution "Community Education" (GO!) is organized on behalf of the 
Flemish Community, fully subsidized by the Flemish government.. 
Subsidized Public 
Education (8% of 
the pupils) 
Subsidized public education comprise municipal education organized by local 
government. School infrastructure  is subsidized by the Flemish government via 
AGIOn: ratio 60% for secondary schools and 70% for primary schools. The 
umbrella organizations of this education network are VSGO (municipalities and 
cities) and POV (provinces). 
Subsidized 
Private Education 
(75,5% of the 
pupils) 
Subsidized private education is organized by private initiatives (not by a public 
authority), mostly Catholic schools, ranging from very large to very small 
organizing bodies and school boards. The umbrella organization of the Catholic 
schools is VSKO. Their school infrastructure is also subsidized by AGIOn at a 
ratio of 60 and 70 %. 
The main source of complexity in the school infrastructure project is this multi-actor 
character, amplified by the decentralized organization of the educational landscape in 
Flanders.  
The Flemish government is the executive branch of the powers of the Flemish Community, 
and acts as the initiator for the PPP project for school infrastructure. Within this project, the 
Flemish government is a multiplex ‘public partner’. 
Table 2: Different ‘faces’ of the Flemish government as ‘public partner’ 
Flemish minister 
of Education 
The current Flemish minister of education is also competent for school 
infrastructure. During the entire course of the project, the education 
competence was held by social-democratic ministers. Education is a full 
competence of the Flemish Community. Other ministers involved: the minister 
of finance and budget (Flemish nationalists) watches over the budgetary 
implications and the minister-president (Christian democrat) is responsible for 
general PPP policy. 
PMV PMV is an independent investment government company, participating in the 
economic sphere of Flanders and providing financial leverage when the market 
needs it and when necessary financial support for private initiatives is scarce. 
PMV is working with partners through private funds and public private 
partnerships. 
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AGIOn This public agency finances and subsidizes the purchase, construction and 
renovation of schools for compulsory education and colleges, and ensures the 
coordination and facilitation of the DBFM program. It is currently an 
‘internally autonomous agency with public law legal personality’, so remains 
under ministerial hierarchy but with some operational decision making 
authority delegated to the agency head. 
School Invest Together with AGIOn (50%), PMV (50%) created ‘School Invest’ to invest in 
the DBFM-company. ‘School Invest’ holds a minority share of 25% +1 in the 
DBFM company ‘Schools of Tomorrow’.  
The DBFM company (SPV) is called ‘Schools of Tomorrow’ and is responsible for the 
execution of the program. AG Real Estate and BNP Paribas Fortis make up the private 
partners who hold a majority share of 75% -1. AG Real Estate is a real estate company with 
extensive experience in developing and maintaining large construction projects and is fully 
owned by AG Insurance. BNP Paribas Fortis adds financial expertise and know-how to the 
program. The DBFM company enters into contracts with the delegated developer AG Real 
Estate CopID (a subsidiary of AG Real Estate), the school boards and other private parties 
involved (e.g. architects, contractors, urban planners). 
 Technical complexity 
A major technical challenge for the project was the specific situation of the targeted school 
infrastructure. The list of individual school projects was so diverse that standardization was 
very difficult: projects were large or small, more technical or art schools with specific 
demands, new school buildings or renovation of existing schools, some schools were 
protected as cultural heritage, etc. Many individual projects were too small scale for stand-
alone PPPs, due to high transaction costs associated with such a type of partnership. As a 
result, the Flemish government opted for a bundled or aggregated program of more than 200 
projects with high diversity. By placing one huge program in the market for a public tender 
procedure, the technical complexity increased significantly.  
Moreover, the specific situation of and legislation on education (including absolute autonomy 
of education organizing bodies) and the diversity of educational landscape with each network 
having their particular procedures and characteristics also complicated things. The specific 
financial situation was also different: community education was fully funded while the 
subsidized networks had to secure their own funding up to 20-30% of the investment value of 
the new infrastructures (which was not obvious especially for the subsidized private schools).  
Another major technical issue is the legal and financial structure of the project. Main 
challenge was finding a way to get the project off the government’s balance sheet, while 
retaining some government control and steering in the process and providing an extended 
government guarantee on the long-term loans (lowering overall cost price). Yet, financing a 
DBFM program with a total value of more than EUR 1.5 billion proved very difficult, 
especially in financial turbulent times. Complexity was increased because of the huge and 
unseen scale of the project. PPP contracting automatically brings along some legal and 
financial complexities, but these are amplified because the ambitious nature of the project and 
the lack of a proven track record. Without much first-hand experience and expertise regarding 
DBFM projects, the Flemish government opted for a ‘big bang’ option: implementing one 
large catch-up program at once; with much emphasis on public expertise development along 
the way. 
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 Political complexity 
Political complexity of the project is closely related to multi-actor complexity (e.g. existence 
of different schools networks). These various school networks are rooted in the ideological 
struggle of Liberals and Socialists on the one hand and Catholics on the other hand about the 
role of the state in education and the position of private education during the nineteenth and 
twentieth century. Today, this struggle is no longer  prominent, but there remains a delicate 
balance between the different networks, and consequently between the different political 
parties. Education is a political salient issue and constitutes almost 40% of the total 
expenditures of the Flemish government. It also has a strong tradition of elaborated 
deliberation with the ‘field’ (umbrella organizations, unions, etc.). Moreover, given the value 
of EUR 1.5 billion of the DBFM program, all relevant political actors watch it closely. 
Political complexity is also increased by the societal urgency of the project.  
PPP governance 
When looking at the actual governance of the PPP project ‘Schools of Tomorrow’, it will 
become clear how the complexities are handled with in order to pursuit the initial objectives 
of the program (See figure 2). 
 Initiating the project structure ( n° 3 in figure 2) 
In the literature, two main types of PPPs are distinguished (e.g. Edelenbos and Klijn 2009). In 
the contractual model (inspired by PFI in the UK) PPP is a turnkey project in which a private 
actor contracts to design, finance and construct a public sector project. Private maintenance 
and exploitation may also be part of the contract. In the participative model, public and 
private actors establish a joint company to develop, maintain and operate projects. Different 
projects are combined to reinforce each other and to create an value added through real co-
production. Because the intertwinement of public and private partners is higher in the second 
model, it can be viewed as an advanced PPP-type. The Flemish ‘hybrid’ model however 
combines both models (Van Gestel, Voets, and Verhoest 2011). It has a double control and 
steering structure: (1) a separate and mixed company (SPV) to execute the program and (2) a 
strict DBFM framework agreement between the SPV and the Flemish government( n° 2 in 
figure 2), and separate DBM and F-contracts between the SPV and other private partners. 
This sui generis hybrid model is internationally unseen and untested, and hence an interesting 
test case for an international audience. 
To manage all complexities, the Flemish government opted for a SPV responsible for the PPP 
(DBFM) program of all individual schools. Several advantages of this structure were 
expected. Firstly, the projects would be performed faster compared to school boards providing 
full realization of construction or renovation by themselves. Secondly, the SPV could 
specialize in its core-task: performing integrated contracts for school construction, while 
school boards focus on the provision of education. Thirdly, the long-term commitment of the 
SPV would produce sustainable buildings (because the company also guaranteed the long-
term maintenance). Fourthly, the SPV would enable the coordination of various parties 
involved in the construction, which might limit realization time. Fifthly, it enables pooling 
certain purchasing procedures (called bargaining power: e.g. if the SPV negotiates the 
insurance-package for the full program, this might be less expensive than if each individual 
building project had to run through the same procedure) and reduces transaction costs. 
Finally, the specialized construction coordination could be conducted by specialized 
personnel in the SPV. Especially the fifth and sixth potential benefit seems to derive  directly 
from the choice for a single project company for the entire program.  
Besides bundling several small projects (n° 1 in figure 2), the Flemish government also opted 
for a public participation in the project company for several reasons (n° 3 in figure 2). 
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Because the private partner would mainly act from a profit-maximizing perspective, it was 
important that a public counterweight watched closely over the educational and societal 
perspectives. Second, given the large LT (financial) commitment, the public partner wanted a 
structural direct control over the DBFM program. To ensure ESA-neutrality of the project, the 
Flemish government opted for a minority stake of 25%+1. This stake provided some minority 
protection according to company law (de facto veto power in decision making). So, next to an 
elaborate contract surveillance and steering, the Flemish government can partly control and 
steer the process through the Board of Directors of the SPV. A specific supervisor of the 
Flemish government was also appointed as a non-voting member to watch carefully over the 
execution of the DBFM program. The direct participation also allowed the Flemish 
government to learn directly from the process; important given the lack of first-hand 
experience and expertise. Finally, its financial participation lowered the threshold for private 
partners and a possible financial return in case of a profit.   
Figure 2: Project structure 
 
 
AGIOn got additional money to set up a subsidiary called ‘School Invest’, sharing it 50/50 
with PMV. School Invest then participates in the DBFM company (SPV) for 25% + 1 share, 
worth EUR 40.25 million (n° 3 in figure 2). The Flemish government wanted private financial 
partners with experience in real estate activities and companies. Such an exclusive choice for 
consortiums with a financial partner (and not for instance large project developers) is rather 
atypical and inconsistent with international PPP standards and practice, but several elements 
explain this. The first idea was that a financial partner would lead to a more ‘classical’ 
approach, namely easier and cheaper financing and more opportunities for smaller contractors 
and developers. The second idea was to let the financial partners do the project management, 
although this is not their core business.  
The project company then makes school infrastructure available on the basis of individual 
DBFM contracts with the school boards (n° 4 in figure 2). AGIOn would pay part of the 
availability fees, following existing subsidized rates in the different educational networks and 
levels, while school boards pay the remaining part. The advantage for school boards is a 
standardized contract, instead of every board making additional costs for legal advice. 
The structure seemed to meet some elements of complexity. Yet, some other actors, including 
the Flemish PPP Knowledge Centre, pointed to potential challenges of this structure. The 
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project structure, for instance, deviated strongly from international standards on PPP. Critical 
questions included: Are smaller clusters not preferable above such a large program? Are 
consortiums based on financial institutions the most appropriate private partners for realizing 
a school infrastructure program? Are deviations from international standards wisely when 
first-hand experience and expertise is missing?  
 Public-public stage: Process (n°1 in figure 2) 
Following the publication of the project in 2004, the school networks were asked to respond 
to the plans. As expected, their main concerns related to the ownership structure (different for 
different networks), distribution of resources across the networks, additional costs of 
alternative financing (especially for the subsidized school networks), critical mass of projects, 
and difficulties in ex ante specification of the existing needs. After this initial consultation, 
feedback to education networks was limited. Despite the decentralized educational landscape, 
‘the largest PPP project in Flanders’ was set up in a fairly centralized manner. Moreover, the 
key players feared that a broad interactive process with many stakeholders would lead to slow 
and ‘sticky’ decision-making. As PPP promised faster implementation, such an interactive 
approach was no option. 
Because of the enormous complexity of the project (no previous experience with such 
projects, limited expertise, huge scale, bundled large program, ‘hybrid’ PPP governance 
structure, multi-actor complexity, financial and legal complexity), the project structure was in 
practice elaborated by a small group of experts. Flemish minister of education and his cabinet 
worked on the project structure with the support of specialized law and financial firms,  more 
or less decoupled from other actors like the Flemish PPP Knowledge Centre or other ministers 
in the Flemish government. Although most Flemish PPP projects follow the participative 
model (with PMV included as one of the shareholders), it is remarkable how much the project 
structuring differs each time. Probably the specificity of the educational policy domain 
explains this ‘unique’ project structuring.  
The educational field – most notably subsidized private education - considered transparency 
and communication towards the education networks insufficient. The subsidized private 
education feared that the uniqueness and specificity of its network – most notably the fact that 
they were not entirely subsidized – was neglected, and that this structure was not the cheapest 
solution for their school boards. To build trust, the final selection of the projects was done by 
a selection committee with extensive representation from the representative umbrella 
organizations of school boards. This committee helped to limit concerns on distribution of 
resources between the different networks. 
 Selection stage (n°2 in figure 2) 
The Flemish government decided in 2006 that AGIOn would conduct the negotiation and 
award procedure for the selection of the SPV-partner. Candidates were expected to take the 
role of equity provider, to formulate a proposal with respect to the overall financing, and to 
have the necessary experience and expertise relating to real estate development. This 
negotiation process was guided by an advisory committee (with PMV, Department of 
Finance, Inspection of Finances, AGIOn and the cabinet of the minister of education). 
The public tender procedure (a negotiated procedure with prior publication of a notice) was 
open for consortiums with a financial partner. The competitive process lasted for two years 
and four candidates entered the BAFO phase: DEXIA/KBC, Fortis Bank/Fortis Real Estate 
(in 2008 BNP Paribas bought 75% of the shares of Fortis), Cofinimmo / Gemeentelijke 
Holding, Barclays Capital / Meridiam Infrastructure / NIB Capital. In December 2008, the 
Flemish government approved the proposal by the contracting authority to select Fortis as the 
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preferred candidate. Due to the financial crisis in September 2008 which had a tremendous 
impact on Fortis (Fortis was first nationalized and then sold to BNP Paribas), the final 
negotiations were delayed. Fortis had to rely on other banks like Dexia and KBC to secure the 
financing of the program. To keep the project on track, in addition to an already extended sub 
sovereign guarantee scheme, the Flemish government provided a refunding guarantee in 
respect of the private lender. In August 2009, the contract was closed, except for the financial 
part. The financial close finally took place on June 10, 2010, three and a half years after 
publication of the tender. 
During the tendering procedure, the school networks received little information and mostly 
through informal channels. Under these conditions, the school networks tried to form the 
blueprint of the final project structure and procedure.  
In 2010, nearly four years after the selection of projects, the SPV was founded. Its goals are: 
- Exert all possible means to maximize individual DBFM contracts with school boards to 
finish the school building projects as soon as possible; 
- Ensuring the financing of school buildings; 
- The implementation of the design, construction and maintenance of the institutions that 
are the subject of the construction program and described in the individual DBFM 
contracts in accordance with the competition rules set in public procurement rules; 
- Ensuring the project management and coordination of the construction as well as 
supervising the construction and maintenance; 
- Exert all possible means to build and maintain each institution as cost-efficiently as 
possible without lowering quality; 
- Transfer the infrastructure after 30 years without charge; 
- Set up a system of risk management. 
The DBFM framework agreement between the SPV and the Flemish government, detailing 
these goals, is secret because of confidentiality issues (despite heavy pressure from the main 
education networks). The issue of commercial confidentiality hampering transparency and 
eroding public legitimacy of PPPs is something various authors warn for (e.g. Coghill and 
Woodward 2005; Flinders 2005; Shaoul 2005). Nevertheless, a number of provisions relating 
to risk sharing that have a (potentially) strong impact on future development of the project 
could be deducted. One issue is the allocation of the volume risk on the side of the Flemish 
government. Despite the ambition of the Flemish government to shift the volume risk towards 
the private partner (next to including maintenance in the program of school infrastructure), the 
volume risk eventually shifted back towards the Flemish government. As a result, an 
important incentive for the SPV to keep as many schools as possible on board, was 
eliminated. In that way it became a fortiori important for the Flemish government to convince 
as many school boards as possible. Two calls were organized to the subsidized private 
education network.  
 Operational stage (n°4 in figure 2) 
In March 2009 the establishment of 'School Invest’ was speeded up. In anticipation of the 
start of the SPV, School Invest got the task to prepare the first twenty projects in the DBFM 
portfolio. The relevant school boards were extensively briefed on their role and that of School 
Invest in a plenary information session and individual consultation sessions on the spot. 
In the subsequent discussions between the schools and School Invest, especially for the 
subsidized networks, a number of problems came up: the possibility to amend the proposed 
project, the assessment of the financial feasibility, listed buildings (cultural heritage) and the 
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problem of the already appointed architects. Although no immediate solution was available, 
School Invest engaged itself to quickly create clarity not to jeopardize the successful 
development of the DBFM program. Meanwhile, the preparation of the project proceeded. At 
the end of 2009 AGIOn asked school boards to update their building programs.   
In 2010, the SPV was finally operational. Due to the constitutional right of freedom of 
education, school boards could not be forced to take part in the DBFM program. Their initial 
commitment however was high because the PPP ‘promised’ improvement of their 
infrastructures more rapidly. The schools were also allowed to stay in the second policy track 
by obtaining their spot on the regular waiting list, ensuring that the choice for PPP had no ex 
ante negative consequences. However, the ranking of many schools improved during the 
years that the PPP was being set up, weakening the promise of earlier realization through PPP.  
After the SPV was established, further information and communication actions started 
towards the school boards, inviting them to participate in the DBFM program. Although 
school boards were visited individually and the contract and the program was explained, 
many questions concerning the actual implementation of the project remained unanswered.  
The fact that the original ambition in 2006 of 702,000 m2 gross and 211 school projects worth 
EUR 1 billion was downsized in 2010 to a considerably smaller volume of investments 
(625,000 m2) and 167 school projects for a total of 1.5 billion, reinforced the fear of the 
subsidized networks. Concerns about the cost of DBFM, already voiced in 2005, were re-
enforced as well. For the community schools, enjoying 100% subsidies, the DBFM program 
was no risk and even a welcome addition to the regular funding. 
Meanwhile, the pressure on school boards increased from September 15th 2010 onwards, as 
the official invitation to join the DBFM project was sent, giving them 75 days to approve it. 
However, due to uncertainties about the program, many school boards were not inclined to 
participate. Firstly, in some cases, the contribution (the "availability fee") of school boards 
(subsidized networks) would take 80 percent, with peaks up to 120 percent of their operating 
budget, for a thirty year period. Completely ‘unfeasible’ and ‘unaffordable’ was the reaction 
of the subsidized networks. Secondly, because of the delay in the kick-off of DBFM, a 
number of the selected projects could be realized in the regular system in the period 2007-
2010.  
The Flemish government then decided to provide the subsidized education within the DBFM 
program with an increase of  11.5% in subsidies; and AGIOn asked the networks themselves 
to actively try to promote the program. The school boards however remained wary, lacking 
prior knowledge and specific expertise and trying to interact with a highly specialized SPV 
supported by a battery lawyers and experts that had full understanding of all the clauses of the 
DBFM agreement. Neither the network organizations nor the school boards had access to the 
actual DBFM framework between the Flemish government and the SPV and its contents, 
making them dependent on secondary sources (e.g. the individual DBFM contracts) to 
understand the regulatory context of these transactions. The networks claimed some critical 
issues were not yet solved (e.g. the needed input of own resources, accelerated repayment, 
references to the framework agreement, third party use of future school infrastructure). 
These uncertainties forced AGIOn and the SPV to ensure that none of the school board would 
be deleted from the portfolio just because of exceeding the deadline of 75 calendar days to 
decide on their participation. By the end of 2010, it became clear that the quota for the 
subsidized private education for the portfolio was not going to be met. In accordance with the 
framework agreement between the government and the private partner, a new call was 
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launched. If this call failed, the remaining quota would be passed on to the other networks 
(Community Education). As a result, in July 2011 the quota was reached. The delays so far 
increased the pressure to accelerate the closing of the individual DBFM contracts. 
Mid 2012, the DBFM company signed 167 pre-contracts corresponding to at least 200 
schools: 108 for subsidized private education, 28 for subsidized official education and 31 for 
state education. The project was finally on track, at least for what the number of participating 
schools was concerning (although the number represented less m²).The ambition for realizing 
all projects was shifted towards 2017, and the start of the construction stage of the first project 
is expected late 2012. 
Performance 
Six years after the ratification of the decree concerning the catch-up in school infrastructure in 
2006, not a single school has been built or renovated within the PPP-framework. Although 
evaluating PPPs is a difficult task because they harbor so many different promises ((Hodge 
(2010) lists fifteen of them), table 3 presents the various objectives and a prudent estimation 
of the current situation. 
Table 3: Performance  
“[…] school boards could focus on 
the provision of education.” 
 
The detailed and formalistic character of the DBFM 
approach, with a financial focus, requires diligent action from 
the school boards, and a structured, professional and above all 
well-timed monitoring system. All this in order to avoid 
compromising their liability and safeguarding their rights 
regarding the DBFM company. If the school boards want to 
fully exploit the potential benefits regarding qualitative 
school infrastructure embedded in the current DBFM-scheme, 
they still have an important task during the availability stage. 
“The long-term commitment of the 
SPV would produce buildings that 
are sustainable“ 
Out of the scope of this article, but the first results are 
promising. There are a lot of innovative designs with great 
attention to sustainability. In addition, the SLAs are of a 
higher level of severance than is usually the case, making it 
difficult to compare the maintenance component. Especially 
in Subsidized Private Education, the maintenance aspect is 
strongly linked to the available (and limited) budgets. 
“[…] a favorable effect on the 
realization time.” 
Not yet verifiable. 
“The possibility of pooling certain 
purchasing procedures  and reduce 
transaction costs.” 
Ex post evaluation of this item must be awaited. A tender 
procedure for subcontractors has been carried out. The 
selected consortia will be able to compete for individual 
projects.  
“The specialized construction 
coordination could be conducted by 
specialized personnel in the SPV.” 
The delegated developer AG Real Estate CopID has a team of 
ca. 50 specialized people to execute the program. 
“The projects would be performed 
faster than if the school boards had 
to provide the full realization of the 
construction or renovation by 
themselves.” 
During initial forecasts in 2006 it was expected that in 2011 
all schools within the project would be realized. Early 2012, 
this forecast shifted to 2017. 11 years (2006-2017) after the 
ratification of the decree concerning the catch-up in school 
infrastructure, this aspect of value added will have lost its 
authority entirely. 
 “The program makes a contribution 
to maximum realization with limited 
resources.” 
Not in the scope of this article, although it is clear that this 
investment could not be made within the conventional budget. 
Gewijzigde veldcode
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“The creation of an additional 
incentive for employment and the 
construction industry” 
 
Not in the scope of this article. 
“The creation of modern and 
appropriate school infrastructure” 
 
Not in the scope of this article, although it looks that this 
objective will be achieved, but it might also have been 
achieved in a standard public procurement procedure. 
“The creation of  a flexible and 
organic school infrastructure”  
 
No information available. 
“ESA-95 neutral” Uncertain. The ESA95-neutrality of the project may be 
compromised because of the government guarantees deemed 
necessary in relation to the bankability of the project. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Nowadays PPP is a widely used method for creating and delivering public goods or services. 
Nevertheless, there is still need for further research in order to gain insight into the actual 
governance of PPPs and the impact on its performance. Therefore, this article tries to make a 
contribution to the PPP research and literature in two ways: by presenting a useful analytical 
framework to investigate PPP performance; and by applying it to a complex Flemish PPP 
project through detailed description. The Flemish school infrastructure DBFM program offers 
a good example to examine how complexity and governance of PPPs affects overall 
performance.  
The Flemish government faced a difficult policy challenge, namely to rapidly create new 
school infrastructure in the complex decentralized educational landscape with a long tradition 
of consultation. Budget constraints forced the Flemish government to explore new ways (ESA 
neutral) to finance this operation. A DBFM formula was chosen with the promise of budget 
neutrality as the main driver, but other advantages were anticipated (short term results, 
maximum realization with limited resources, modern school infrastructure, low energy 
buildings, professionalization). While most DBFM projects are rather complex by nature, the 
Flemish government added complexity by choosing a very large, bundled program, and 
multifaceted ‘hybrid’ governance structure which was internationally unseen and untested. 
The main reason for the latter was the strong desire to retain some direct control.  
Not only is this DBFM program an ongoing learning process for the Flemish government, it 
also developed rather isolated from other relevant actors. The minister of education and his 
cabinet, supported by specialized law and financial firms, structured and shaped the PPP 
project, without much cross-departmental expertise exchange or learning. This centralized 
decision-making structure based on a small group of experts clashed with the rather 
decentralized educational landscape and was negative for building trust between the clients 
(educational networks and school boards) and the providers (SPV) in the program.  
Despite reasonable and well-intended arguments for choosing this large ‘bundled’ DBFM 
program and this particular ‘hybrid’ governance structure, this paper explained that the 
Flemish government chose a very difficult and complex option which deviated from the 
international PPP standards and practices. This may seem odd because Flanders was rather 
late with developing a PPP policy, and one could expect the Flemish government to really 
more heavily on international best practices, and tested and competitive models (instead of 
introducing new ones). The complexities of the PPP-setting were also influenced negatively 
by unforeseeable external events, most notably the financial crisis in 2008. In short, the PPP 
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school infrastructure in Flanders illustrates what can happen when a complex solution is 
chosen for a complex problem in a worsening environment. In this case it led to many delays, 
incremental costs and various difficult implementation obstacles.  
Although evaluating PPP performance is never easy and many goals need to be reckoned 
with, it is interesting to run through the results so far. According to the original plans, most 
schools had to build by the end of 2012, but no new school infrastructure has been built yet 
following the PPP-scheme. The current estimated completion date of all school projects is 
2017. Moreover, the program started with 211 school projects estimated EUR 1 billion, and 
changed to 167 school projects (with a total of 211 school buildings) estimated EUR 1.5 
billion. Furthermore, not all intended advantages were achieved (see table above). The overall 
picture is somewhat disappointing, to understate the obvious conclusion. It is definitely an 
achievement that in such financial turbulent times the DBFM program did not fail, but the 
high expectations are not (yet) realized.  
As conclusion some lessons can be derived from  the case ‘Schools of Tomorrow’. 
Firstly, there is a real danger in choosing for a ‘big bang’ and ‘one shot’ catch-up program. 
PPP projects are intrinsically complex projects and difficult to manage, especially in a case 
where no previous experience or exemplary project is available. The bundled structure adds 
even more challenges regarding coordination and management. Moreover, the close 
interrelation of numerous projects includes a real contamination risk between projects. If only 
one or some projects default, the entire PPP scheme can come at risk. 
Secondly, innovative and creative PPP structures can look very interesting from a theoretical 
perspective, but in reality can lead to a long and difficult implementation process. Especially 
in a market that has become more risk averse and where market players look for projects and 
structures they know. 
Last but not least the most important lesson from this case in terms of PPP performance is 
probably that when a government is confronted with a very complex policy challenge and 
context, it is probably less risky to opt for a more cautious incremental approach, which 
attempts to simplify the governance structure as much as possible and which is supported by 
international tested standards and ‘best practices’. 
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